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Microprocessors are increasingly being used in a variety of applications from
small computers to life critical applications. With increasing dependence on mi-
croprocessor based systems in critical applications, greater importance needs to be
given not only to performance but also to correctness and dependability. Research
has shown that microprocessors and structures of the microprocessors such as mi-
croarchitectural logic state elements and memories are vulnerable to alpha particle
impacts (Single Event Upsets) and timing errors which will lead to Soft errors and
affect program correctness and reliability.
In this thesis, we have modified the Razor flip-flops and explored the use of
these Modified Razor flip-flops in the Instruction Queue (IQ), the Reorder Buffer
(ROB), the Level 1 Data Cache (DL1), the Load Queue (LQ) and the Store Queue
(SQ) to increase their respective reliability and hence the overall reliability of the
microprocessor. Modified Razor flip-flops detect soft errors and along with archi-
tectural modifications, ensure correctness of the microprocessor operation, thus re-
sulting in decrease of vulnerability and increase of reliability. We have adopted
Architecturally Correct Execution (ACE) time based techniques to measure the
Architecture Vulnerability Factor (AVF) of high performance microprocessors and
their internal structures using the SPEC 2000 integer benchmarks. The contribu-
tion of individual bit-fields of the structures towards the overall AVF is computed,
and the fields with higher contribution towards the overall ACE Time are identi-
fied. We have computed the reduction in AVF with the introduction of Modified
Razor flip-flops for various combinations of fields that have high vulnerability. How-
ever, introduction of Modified Razor flip-flops results in higher area requirement on
the die and higher power consumption. We have developed RTL models for IQ,
ROB, LQ, and SQ to measure the increase in area and average power consumption.
Area requirement and power consumption estimates for the data cache are done
using Cacti-based techniques. We have identified the most cost-effective solution by
identifying the fields of these microarchitectural structures - where Modified Razor
flip-flops are introduced - that result in the highest percentage decrease in AVF per
unit area-power product.
We observe that, by introducing Modified Razor flip flops selectively in fields
with the highest percentage decrease in AVF per unit area-power (identified by
our work as opcode and destination operand field of IQ, destination operand and
destination operand value field of ROB, tag array of DL1, address field of LQ and
SQ), the overall AVF of the micro-processor decreases by 32.23%, but the area
requirement increases by 16.99% and the average power consumption increases by
10.33%.
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Continuous improvement in CMOS technology has provided a steady increase
in processor performance. However, due to scaling in feature size, voltage, den-
sity, microprocessors are vulnerable to soft errors. Soft errors are predicted to be
the largest contributors of vulnerability of microprocessors and have emerged as a
key challenge to reliability [1]. Technology trends have caused soft error rates in
microprocessors to increase to levels that require changes to the design and imple-
mentation of present and future computing systems [2].
1.1 Soft Errors and Single Event Upsets
Soft errors are bit errors induced primarily due to Single Event Upsets (SEUs).
The primary cause of SEUs are external radiations such as alpha particles and high
energy neutrons from packaging materials, which trigger a change in the logic state
of a semiconductor device. Secondary causes of soft errors include transient faults
caused due to dynamic voltage scaling, voltage drops in the power supply networks,
temperature fluctuations, and gate-length and doping concentration variations due
to noise etc [3]. Soft errors do not cause or reflect a permanent fault in the device
but introduce logical errors in the circuit’s operation. Soft errors have made an
impact on the industry and important microprocessor manufacturers because they
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have caused random crashes in major customer sites [4].
1.2 Reliability, Vulnerability and Quantifying Vulnerability
Reliable operation and correctness are among the crucial concerns, apart from
performance, for designing and manufacturing viable microprocessors. Soft errors
are a major source of decrease in the reliability of microprocessors. Memory and
microarchitectural logic state elements of the processors are vulnerable to soft er-
rors. Techniques have been developed to estimate the soft error rates for various
structures in microprocessors [1, 5]. Not all soft errors affect the correctness of
the program outcome and hence it is important to quantify the vulnerability of
structures to errors that result in user-visible program errors. Prior research has
developed Architecturally Correct Execution (ACE) bit based analysis to measure
Architecture Vulnerability Factor (AVF) as a measure of vulnerability [6]. AVF
denotes the probability that a fault in a particular structure of the processor will
result in a user-visible error [6]. Techniques also exist to compute AVF for address
based structures [7].
1.3 Reducing Architecture Vulnerability Factor
A variety of techniques exist to prevent program incorrectness caused by soft
errors and thus reduce the probability of generation of user-visible errors. Schemes
such as Radiation hardened circuit design [8], localized error detection and correc-
tion [9], tri-modular [10] and bi-modular [11] redundant schemes, DIVA dynamic
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verification [12], and checker process based schemes [13] have been developed to re-
duce the Architecture Vulnerability Factor. Each of the above methods reduce the
vulnerability of the processor and its structures thereby reducing the Architecture
Vulnerability Factor. Most of the schemes also introduce overheads in area, power,
performance, and cost. Precise vulnerability estimates are required for designers to
identify the correct tradeoff between reduction of vulnerability and cost.
1.4 Our Contribution
In this thesis, we have explored the use of Modified Razor flip-flops in the mi-
croarchitectural logic state elements of microprocessors viz. the Instruction Queue
(IQ), the Reorder Buffer (ROB), the Data Cache (DL1), the Load Queue (LQ),
and the Store Queue (SQ). Modified Razor flip-flops are designed to detect soft er-
rors caused in microarchitectural logic state elements and storage structures within
the microprocessor. Techniques involving Razor flip-flops were used to detect and
correct timing errors in high-speed pipelines using delayed clocks [3]. We have mod-
ified the design of Razor flip-flops in order to be used in microarchitectural logic
state elements and storage structures of any high performance out-of-order micro-
processor. Soft errors, if any, will be detected by the Modified Razor flip-flops and
hence the probability of generating user-visible program errors is minimized, which
reflects in the reduction in the Architecture Vulnerability Factor of the processor.
It is important to note that the introduction of Modified Razor flip-flops into the
microprocessors would lead to increased area requirement and power consumption.
3
In our work, we have investigated the use of Modified Razor flip-flops in se-
lected bit fields of the microarchitectural logic state elements and the data cache
that will result in the highest percentage decrease in the overall AVF of the micro-
processor with the least increase in the area requirement and power consumption.
The rest of our effort is divided into three steps. First, we compute the AVF for
microarchitectural logic state elements and the data cache using the out-of-order
SimAlpha functional simulator and SPEC 2000 integer benchmarks. Further, we
compute the contribution of each field of the IQ, ROB, DL1, LQ, and SQ towards
the overall vulnerability of the respective structure so as to identify the fields of
the microarchitectural logic state elements having high vulnerabilities. Second, we
introduce our Modified Razor flip-flops for different combinations of the bit fields
in each microarchitectural logic state element that would yield us the maximum
reduction in overall AVF. As the third and final step of our work, for each of the
combinations of fields identified in the second step, we compute the increase in area
requirement and power consumption. We have developed RTL models to measure
the exact increase in area requirement and power consumption for microarchitec-
tural logic state elements. Area and power measurements for cache are done using
Cacti [14]. We calculate the percentage decrease in AVF per unit area-power prod-
uct for each of the microarchitectural logic state element and for the data cache to
identify the best possible bit fields where Modified Razor flip-flops can be used and
also remain cost effective.
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes the back-
ground and terminology related to soft errors and Architecture Vulnerability Factor.
Chapter 3 describes the AVF computation of the microprocessor and its microar-
chitectural logic state elements viz. the IQ, ROB, LQ, SQ and the DL1. Chapter
4 discusses Razor flip-flops and our modifications to the design of Razor flip-flops.
Chapter 5 presents the experimental setup and the results and Chapter 6 summa-
rizes and concludes our work.
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Chapter 2
Soft Errors and Architecture Vulnerability Factor
2.1 Overview
This chapter describes the background and soft error terminology that is fol-
lowed throughout the thesis. The chapter also discusses the background on Archi-
tecture Vulnerability Factor and computation of AVF for structures under consid-
eration.
2.2 Soft Errors and Impact on Industry
Bit errors are mainly caused from energized particles such as neutrons from
cosmic rays and alpha particles from packaging material, generating electron hole
pairs as they pass through the semiconductor device. Transistor source and diffusion
nodes can collect these charges. A sufficient amount of accumulated charge may
invert the logic state of a device such as an SRAM cell, a gate, or a flip-flop [15].
Because these types of errors do not reflect a permanent failure of the device, they are
termed as Soft errors. Soft error rates in microprocessors have become an increasing
burden in the industry. One of the main reasons for the increase in soft errors
and transient errors is a significant decrease in the feature size of transistors with
new technologies facilitating the an exponential increase in the number of on-chip
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transistors. Soft errors rates are also high in ultra low power microprocessors which
use techniques like Dynamic Voltage scaling, that lead to reduction in operating and
supply voltage levels.
Soft errors have caused a serious impact on the industry. There are a handful
of documented events in the industry to substantiate the effect of soft errors. In the
fifth generation SPARC64 processor, Fujitsu has protected 80% of the total 200K
latches by parity check error detection, to counter cosmic ray strikes. The mul-
tiply/divide units are protected with residue check and parity prediction circuits
[9]. Boeing Research has published several incidents of cosmic ray strikes in 1996
[16]. Sun Microsystems had acknowledged, in the year 2000, that cosmic ray strikes
on unprotected L2 cache memories on UltraSPARC IIs caused its Ultra Enterprise
servers to crash randomly at several customer sites (AOL, eBay, Verisign, and num-
berous other corporations were affected) [4]. Sun’s UltraSPARC T1 processor has
its integer and floating point register files protected by ECC, an extensive level of
protection matched only by mainframe-class processors [17].
2.3 Silent Data Corruption and Detected Unrecoverable Errors
Figure 2.1 illustrates the possible outcomes of a single bit error. The flow chart
also depicts the scenarios where errors are detected and corrected. From the flow
chart it can be inferred that some bit errors do not cause a change in the program
outcome. Detected Unrecoverable Errors (DUE) are those errors which cannot be
corrected. DUEs can in turn be classified as True DUE and False DUE. As the
7
Figure 2.1: Soft Error Classification and Outcome.
names imply, True DUEs cause errors in the program outcome while False DUEs do
not. Silent Data Corruption (SDC) is a scenario where a bit error causes a change
in the program output, and is the most insidious form of errors. In order to enhance
reliability, the errors have to be identified and corrected so as to prevent errors in
program correctness.
2.4 Measuring Soft Error Rates
Currently the industry specifies soft error rates in terms of SDC and DUE
numbers, and these are typically expressed using different metrics by vendors. Tra-
ditionally, Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is used as the appropriate metric to
measure system reliability. Other units commonly used are Failure In Time (FIT)
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and Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). MTBF is based on the interval between
failures. MTBF of a component, as the name suggests, is the average time between
failures. FIT is inversely related to MTBF. One FIT specifies one error in one bil-
lion operating hours. A zero error rate implies infinite MTBF and zero FIT. The
overall FIT rate of a chip is calculated as the sum of the effective FIT rates of all the
structures on-chip. Currently, typical FIT rate numbers for latches and SRAM cells
vary from 0.001 FIT/bit to 0.01 FIT/bit at sea level and are projected to remain
the same in the next several technology generations [18, 19, 16, 6].
2.5 Architecture Vulnerability Factor
Figure 2.1 illustrates that not all faults in a microarchitectural structure affect
the final outcome of a program. To illustrate with an example, a bit error in a
branch predictor will not affect the sequence or results of any committed instruc-
tions. Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF) is the probability that a fault in a
processor structure will result in a visible error in the final output of a program.
Thus, the branch predictor’s AVF is 0%. In contrast, a single-bit fault in the com-
mitted program counter will cause the wrong instructions to be executed, almost
certainly affecting the program’s result. Hence, the AVF for the committed program
counter is effectively 100%. Many structures will have an AVF that is in between
these two extremes.
There are two important significance of AVF estimates. First, AVF gives the
designers a measure of reliability of the processor and it does not depend on the
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raw error rates which in turn depends on the two factors - application where the
microprocessor is used and various environmental and fabrication factors. Second,
the error rate of a microarchitectural logic state element is the product of its raw
bit error rate and its AVF [6]. These overall error rates are used by designers and
architects to ensure that over protection is not built into the structures for error
detection and correction even where bit errors in these structures do not cause
errors in program outcomes. For these structures, the estimated AVF will be low.
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Chapter 3
Computation of Architecture Vulnerability Factor
3.1 Overview
This chapter describes the computation of AVF for the microarchitectural
structures viz. the Instruction Queue (IQ), the Reorder Buffer (ROB), the Data
Cache (DL1), the Load Queue (LQ), and the Store Queue (SQ). Also discussed is
the accurate computation of the contribution of the bit fields of each of the above
microstructural logic state elements towards the overall AVF of structures.
3.2 ACE Bits and AVF
The AVF of the overall structure is computed by analyzing each individual bit
of every microarchitectural logic state element under consideration. Architecturally
Correct Execution (ACE) bits will cause a visible error in the program outcome if a
bit error is caused in them. Under real time analysis conditions, program outcome
reflects the values conveyed to I/O structures. However, we define program outcome
as the vales that get committed back to structures of the processor. Non-ACE bits
are opposite to the ACE bits, which implies that a visible program error does not
occur if a bit error is caused. The time a particular bit of a microarchitectural
structure holds an ACE bit is defined as ACE Time or Residency of the Bit. The
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AVF of the bit under consideration is the ratio of ACE Time to Total time for which
the bit is analyzed. The AVF can equivalently be defined as the fraction of the time
the microarchitectural storage bit under consideration can be classified as an ACE
bit.
AV F of bit =
ACE Time of Bit (in Cycles) × 100
Total T ime (in Cycles)
(3.1)
The AVF of the microarchitectural structures like IQ, ROB, DL1, LQ and SQ is
defined as




ACE Time of Bit (in Cycles))] × 100
Total T ime (in Cycles) × Total Number of Bits
(3.2)
Equation 3.2 can be extended to all the microarchitectural structures of the micro-
processor to compute the overall AVF of the microprocessor.
3.3 Identifying Control Path ACE and Non-ACE bits
An important aspect of computing AVF is to identify which of the microar-
chitectural storage bits are ACE and Non-ACE bits in the correct path instruction
execution. All microarchitectural storage bits are conservatively assume as ACE
bits unless proved otherwise. Architectural ACE and Non-ACE bits refer to the
ACE and Non-ACE bits that are present in the correct path instruction execution.
For example, an alpha particle strike on an IQ entry in the operand field of a NOP
instruction will not affect the program outcome. Hence, corresponding bits of that
IQ entry which holds the operand field can be considered as Non-ACE and the op-
code field can be considered as ACE. The following four sources are considered for
identifying ACE and Non-ACE bits.
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• NOP instructions - Most instruction sets have NOP instructions which do not
affect the architectural state of the processor. NOP instructions are inserted
for a number of reasons such as to align instructions to address boundaries or
to fill VLIW style instruction templates. Depending on the instruction set,
the opcode field or the destination register specifier are the ACE bits for a
NOP instruction and the remaining bits are considered Non-ACE.
• Performance enhancing instructions - Most modern processors include perfor-
mance enhancing instructions like the prefetch instructions. A single bit error
in a non-opcode field will cause wrong data to be fetched but the architectural
state of the processor will not be affected. Hence, opcode or equivalent fields
are ACE and the rest of the part of the is Non-ACE.
• Dynamically Dead instructions - Dynamically dead instructions are those
whose results are not used by other instructions. Instructions whose results
simply do not get read are called First-level Dynamically Dead (FDD) in-
structions. Transitively Dynamically Dead (TDD) are the instructions whose
results are used only by the FDD instructions or other TDD instructions.
The opcode and destination operand register specifier fields of the FDD and
TDD are considered as ACE bits and the remaining fields are considered as
Non-ACE.
• Trivial Instructions - Logical masking in the operand chains of Trivial instruc-
tions cause a source of Non-ACE bits under certain circumstances. Two types
of Trivial instructions are identified. The first type of Trivial instructions have
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two source register operands and the operand is masked with an immediate
value. Depending on the type of masking and the value of the mask, some
bits can be considered Non-ACE. For example, let us consider the following 2
instructions :
ORI RA, RB, 0xFF00
ANDI RA, RB, 0xFF00
The above ORI instruction performs a bitwise OR operation on the contents of
the RB register with 0xFF00. The 32-16 bits of the register RB are Non-ACE
because an alpha particle attack on these bits do not affect the architectural
state. Similar arguments holds for the ANDI instruction. The second type
of Trivial instructions have one source operand and immediate value. For
example, we consider a multiply instruction with the source operand and an
immediate value. If the value of the source operand is equal to 0, this will
make the bits of the immediate value Non-ACE.
3.4 Identifying Data Path ACE and Non-ACE Bits
Computing AVF for address based structures such as the Data Cache, the
Load Queue and the Store Queue is split into two parts [7].
• AVF and ACE Time for the data bits - Periods of time when the bit is Non-
ACE state are identified. For example, Figure 3.1 shows the sequence of
operations on a cache block. The cache data block can be considered Non-
ACE in the period between two consecutive writes with no reads in between.
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Figure 3.1: Example of Cache Operation and ACE Time between States.
Similar techniques are employed to identify Non-ACE bits for the data bits of
the Load Queue and Store Queue.
• AVF and ACE Time for the tag bits - The second part involves the computa-
tion of ACE Time of the tag bits. The ACE Time of a tag array is measured
by comparing the value of the tag array with the incoming tag bits. If the
hamming distance between the incoming bits and the stored tag array value
is 1 bit, the bits of that tag array are conspired ACE because if a single bit
error occurs in these tag entries, a cache hit will occur and hence would create
a false positive and may cause an error in the program outcome. Conversely,
if the hamming distance is more than 1, a false positive created by an alpha
particle impact will not result in an error in the program outcome and hence
the corresponding tag bits can be considered Non-ACE.
3.5 Computation of ACE Time and AVF
The ACE Time of a bit in a microarchitectural structure is the sum of all the
cycles when the bit under consideration is ACE. ACE Bits and Non-ACE Bits are
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identified for each cycle. ACE Time of a bit is the total number of cycles that the
considered bit is ACE.
• ACE Time of IQ and ROB - Based on the type of instruction stored in the IQ,
particular fields of the IQ are considered ACE or Non-ACE. The ACE Time
of the IQ and the fields of the IQ are computed by multiplying the residency
of an instruction in the IQ with the Number of ACE Bits for that instruction.
For example, the ACE Time contribution by an instruction is given by the
following equation -
ACE Time = (TotalBW − NonACEBW ) × Residency (in Cycles) (3.3)
where the
TotalBW - Total Bit width
NonACEBW - Bit width of all NonACE Bits
Instruction Non-ACE fields Non-ACE fields
Type of IQ of ROB
Dynamically All Source Operand Destination Operand
Dead register specifiers Value
Prefetch and All fields except Status All fields except Status
NOP bits and Opcode bits and Opcode
Trivial 1 One of the Source None
Operands
Trivial 2 Immediate Value or One None
of Source Operands
Table 3.1: Non-ACE fields of IQ and ROB for Instructions.
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Table 3.5 enlists the different type of instructions and for each type of instruc-
tion, the fields of the IQ and ROB that are Non-ACE. All other fields are
conservatively assumed to be ACE when the ACE Time contribution from the
instruction is computed.
• ACE Time of Data cache, LQ, and SQ - The ACE time for the data array is
calculated based on the lifetime analysis presented in the previous section. The
number of cycles between the following state transitions for the data arrays of
the LQ, SQ and the Level 1 Data Cache are considered Non-ACE - idle, fill-to-
write, fill-to-evict, read-to-write, read-to-evict, write-to-write, write-to-evict,
evict-to-fill. The ACE Time of the tag array is calculated by identifying all
possible ACE tags for a particular incoming tag using the hamming distance
analysis and adding the residency of the corresponding bits.
The AVF of microarchitectural structures can be computed using Equations 3.1 and
3.2 after ACE Time has been calculated. The overall AVF of the microprocessor




In this chapter we discuss the design of Modified Razor flip-flops and the use
of Modified Razor flip-flops to prevent Silent Data Corruption and reduce the AVF
of the microprocessor.
4.1 Razor Flip-flops: Background
Razor flip-flops were proposed to detect and correct transient errors that are
caused due to lowering voltage margins as a part of Dynamic Voltage Scaling (DVS)
algorithms [3]. It is necessary to scale voltages as low as possible while ensuring
correct operation of the processor. The critical voltage is chosen such that under
a worst-case scenario of process and environmental variations, the processor always
operates correctly. However, this approach leads to a very conservative supply
voltage, because such a worst-case combination of different variabilities will be very
rare. Razor flip-flops are introduced to detect and correct timing errors that are
caused by lowering voltage margins to very low values. A Razor flip-flop double
samples pipeline stage values, once with a fast clock and again with a delayed clock.
A metastability-tolerant comparator then validates latch values sampled with the
fast clock. In the event of a timing error, a modified pipeline mispeculation recovery
mechanism restores correct program state.
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Figure 4.1: Razor Flip-flops between Logic Stages.
Figure 4.2: Razor Flip-flop Operation.
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Razor relies on a combination of architectural and circuit level techniques for
efficient error detection and correction of transient errors. The concept of Razor is
illustrated in 4.1 for a pipeline stage. Each flip-flop in the design is augmented with
a Shadow Latch which is controlled by a delayed clock. The operation of a Razor
flip-flop is illustrated in 4.2.
In clock cycle 1, the combinational logic L1 meets the setup time by the rising
edge of the clock and both the main flip-flop and the shadow latch will latch the
correct data. In cycle 2, the combinational logic exceeds the intended delay due to
subcritical voltage scaling and hence the data is not latched by the main flip-flop,
but since the shadow-latch operates using a delayed clock, it successfully latches the
data some time in cycle 3. By comparing the valid data of the shadow latch with
the data in the main flip-flop, an error signal is then generated in cycle 3 and in
the subsequent cycle, cycle 4, the valid data in the shadow latch is restored into the
main flip-flop and becomes available to the next pipeline stage L2. The local error
signals Error L are ORed together to ensure that the data in all flip-flops is restored
even when only one of the Razor flip-flops generates an error.
4.2 Modified Razor flip-flops
We have modified the design of the Razor flip-flops to be used for soft error
detection in microarchitectural logic state elements viz. the IQ, the ROB, the LQ,
and the SQ. An SRAM cell with similar error detecting capability is designed for the
cache. Modified Razor flip-flops also rely on architectural and circuit level techniques
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Figure 4.3: Modified Razor Flip-flop.
for efficient error detection and reduction in AVF of the microprocessor. The design
of the Modified Razor flip-flop is shown in Figure 4.3. The logic state stored in a
flip-flop is double sampled and stored in a redundant flip-flop as shown. At any
given instance, both the flip-flops store the same logic state. If a soft error is caused
due to an alpha particle impact, the logic state of one of the flip-flops changes. An
XOR comparator is included in the Modified Razor flip-flop that will generate an
Error signal. This operation is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
In clock cycle 1, the data from D in is sampled in both the flip-flops - the Main
flip-flop and Redundant flip-flop. In clock cycle 2, there is a change in the logic state
of the Main flip-flop which may be caused by an alpha particle impact or any other
cause of a soft error. When the logic state of the Main flip-flop changes, the local
error signal Error L is generated by the XOR comparator signaling an error in the
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Figure 4.4: Modified Razor Flip-flop Operation.
logic state. Depending on the structure in which the Modified Razor flip-flop is used,
architectural changes can be made such that the Error signal can be used to take
appropriate actions to maintain program correctness. Figure 4.5 illustrates how the
Modified Razor flip-flops can be used in the Opcode, Valid and Destination operand
fields of one entry of the Instruction Queue. The Error signals from the Modified
Razor flip-flops are used to reset the Valid bit of the IQ entry. Architectural changes
to maintain correct program execution may include re-fetching the instruction for
the IQ, re-fetching the data for the Data cache, re-executing certain instructions for
the ROB, LQ, or the SQ.
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Figure 4.5: Instruction Queue with Modified Razor Flip-flop in Valid,
Operand and Destination Operand fields.
4.3 Reduction in AVF
We have discussed AVF computation for microarchitectural structures in Chap-
ter 3. The storage bits which are considered in the computation of AVF are consid-
ered always vulnerable to attack and a soft error in the bit may cause an error in
the program outcome, hence increasing the Architecture Vulnerability Factor of the
bit and also of the microprocessor. We have designed the Modified Razor flip-flops,
which have the capability to detect errors caused in storage bits. The error detec-
tion capability of the Modified flip-flops and appropriate architectural techniques for
error handling ensures that the program outcome is never erroneous. If a Modified
Razor flip-flop is introduced into a storage bit instead of a normal flip-flop, we can
safely conclude that, even with single event upsets, a soft error in that bit will never
cause an error in the program outcome. Hence, that particular bit can always be
considered as Non-ACE and the ACE Time contributed by that bit will be 0. The
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For all non−Modified Razor FF Bits
ACE Time of Bit (in Cycles))] × 100
Total T ime (in Cycles) × Total Number of Bits
(4.1)
Non-Modified Razor FF Bits in Equation 4.1 refers to those storage bits that do not
have Modified Razor Flip-flops and hence do not have error detection capabilities.
The principle of AVF reduction is that when the Modified Razor flip-flops are
used for storage bits that have high ACE Time contributions, the reduction in AVF
is considerable, which we have shown in this thesis. In Chapter 5, we show how the
AVF of the structures and also of the overall microprocessor reduce with the use of
Modified Razor flip-flops in the IQ, ROB, DL1, LQ. and the SQ.
4.4 Power and Area Overhead
Modified Razor flip-flops lead to increased power consumption and area over-
head due to built in error detection capabalities. Increase in area is due to the
redundant flip-flop and the comparator that enable error detection capabilities. In-
creased area can also result in additional width of current driving elements whch
drive two flip-flops - main and redunctant flip-flops. Increased power consumption
is mainly due to the doubling of capacitance on the line that drives the input to the
Modified Razor flip-flops. Other forms of power due to static and leakage currents
also increase with introduction of an additional flip-flop. In Chapter 5, we have
quantified the increase in Area and Power with the introduction of Modified Razor
flip-flops into microarchitectural logic state elements viz. the IQ, the ROB, the the
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For microarchitectural simulations, the SimSODA simulator, which is based
on the SimAlpha 2.0, is used [20, 21]. We have modified the SimSODA simulator to
introduce the capability to obtain ACE Time and AVF estimates for each individual
field of the microarchitectural structures. The IQ, ROB, LQ and SQ were modified
and the fields of these structures were modeled. The techniques for computation of
the ACE Time for these fields were added into the model. The IQ, ROB, LQ, and
SQ are modeled based on the microarchitecture of the Compaq DEC Alpha 21264
processor [22]. An out-of-order processor is simulated to obtain the AVF estimates.
Table 5.1 enlists the significant system parameters of the simulated processor.
For simulations, the SPEC 2000 Integer Benchmark suite is used [23]. The fol-
lowing integer benchmarks are used : bzip2, crafty, eon, gap, gcc, gzip, mcf, parser,
perlbmk, twolf, vortex and vpr. We have concentrated our efforts on the integer
benchmarks as the simulation with SimAlpha for integer benchmarks are reported
to be more accurate than the floating point benchmarks [21, 24]. To reduce simula-
tion time while still maintaining representative program behavior, SimPoint analysis
is used on the twelve integer points selected [25]. Table 5.1 presents the number of
instructions to be skipped and the input data set selected. Each benchmark is then
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System Parameter Value
ROB Size 80 entries
Integer IQ Size 20 entries
Floating Point IQ Size 15 entries
LQ Size 32 entries
SQ Size 32 entries
L1 Cache : Split I and D 64KB, 2 way set associative
Fetch Width 4 instruction/cycle
Decode Width 4 instruction/cycle
Integer Issue Width 4 instruction/cycle
Floating Point Issue Width 2 instruction/cycle
Functional Units 4 Integer Execution Units
1 Floating Point Exec Units
Cluster 1 Integer Cluster
1 Floating Point Cluster
Table 5.1: Processor Configuration.
simulated for 100 million instructions.
5.2 RTL Models
We developed RTL models for the IQ, ROB, LQ and SQ to accurately measure
the increase in area and power. We used Verilog 2000 to design the RTL models.
















Table 5.2: Instructions skipped in SPEC 2000 Benchmarks.
of the structures [26]. The lsi 10k ASIC standard cell library is used for synthesis.
Power and area reports from the Synopsys Design Compiler are obtained by choosing
the highest level of optimization and highest detail of analysis. Figures 5.1, 5.2 and
5.3 depict the Register Transfer level design of the microarchitectural structures
under consideration and the fields of each of the structures.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the structure of the Instruction Queue. The IQ is modeled
to have 20 entries with each entry having a bit width to hold one instruction (which
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Figure 5.1: RTL Model of Instruction Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
includes the opcode, destination and source operand register specifiers) and other
bits which involve execution unit selection bits and a Valid bit. The error signals
from the Modified Razor flip-flops of an IQ entry are ORed and is used to reset
the Valid bit of that IQ. The model for the ROB is similar to the IQ model and is
illustrated in Figure 5.2.Each entry of the ROB has the following fields : the valid
and complete bits, the program counter, the opcode bits, the destination operand
register specifier and the destination operand value. The ROB is modeled to have 80
entries. The model for the LQ/SQ is shown in figure 5.3. Each entry of the LQ/SQ
have valid and complete bits, destination/source address bits and destination/source
value bits. The LQ/SQ is modeled to have 32 entries.
5.3 AVF and ACE Time
AVF computation is done using the techniques described in Chapter 3. The
ACE Time for all the fields are computed. The residency of each committed instruc-
tion in a given structure is measured and accumulated to obtain the ACE Time of
29
Figure 5.2: RTL Model of Reorder Buffer with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Figure 5.3: RTL Model of Load/Store Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
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Figure 5.4: AVF of Instruction Queue.
the structure. Figures 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 show the AVF values for the IQ, the
ROB, the DL1, the LQ and the SQ respectively. Each graph shows the AVF for all
SPEC 2000 integer benchmarks. We see that the Average AVFs of IQ, ROB, DL1,
LQ and SQ are 16.98%, 30.37%, 31.66%, 21.65% and 29.28% respectively.
In order to understand the contribution of ACE Time from the individual fields
of the structures towards the overall AVF, we look the ACE Time contribution from
the individual fields for each structure. Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 show
the ACE Time distribution from the IQ, the ROB, the DL1, the LQ, and the SQ.
From the graphs below, we see that Average ACE Time contributions of Operand
field of IQ (37.72%), Program counter field of ROB (61.68%), Data Array of Data
Cache (67.61%), Address field of Load Queue (56.08%) and Address field of Store
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Figure 5.5: AVF of Reorder Buffer.
Figure 5.6: AVF of Level 1 Data Cache.
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Figure 5.7: AVF of Load Queue.
Figure 5.8: AVF of Store Queue.
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Figure 5.9: ACE Time distribution of Instruction Queue.
Queue (59.35%) towards their respective structures are significant. As these fields
have significant contributions towards overall AVF and towards the AVF of their
respective structures, we introduce Modified Razor flip-flops into these fields and
into a combination of fields which high ACE Time contributions.
5.4 Reduction in AVF with Modified Razor flip-flops
Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 illustrate the contributions of each in-
dividual field towards the ACE Time of the overall structure, which in-turn is the
reflection of the contribution of each field towards the AVF of the structure. We saw
that the contributions of some fields are significant and we introduce the Modified
Razor flip-flops into these fields to decrease the AVF. The AVF is calculated for
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Figure 5.10: ACE Time distribution of Reorder Buffer.
Figure 5.11: ACE Time distribution of Level 1 Data Cache.
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Figure 5.12: ACE Time distribution of Load Queue.
Figure 5.13: ACE Time distribution of Store Queue.
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Figure 5.14: AVF of Instruction Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
the structures with Modified Razor flip-flops as presented in the Chapter 4. We
have computed the reduction in the AVF of the structures when our Modified Razor
flip-flops are introduced in fields that have a high contribution of ACE Time. In
order to reduce AVF further, we have explored the introduction of these Modified
Razor flip-flops in more than one fields.
Figures 5.9 shows a scenario where our Modified Razor flip-flops are intro-
duced in the various fields of the IQ. We introduce Modified flip-flops in the opcode
field, the destination and source operand fields and combinations of these fields.
In Figure 5.14, we see that Modified Razor flip-flops are introduced in the Op-
code field (IQ wo opcode), the Source and Destination Operand fields (IQ wo opr1,
IQ wo opr2 and IQ wo dest). Figure 5.16 shows the percentage decrease in the
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Figure 5.15: AVF of Instruction Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
AVF of the IQ for each case. To further decrease the AVF, we introduce our
Modified Razor flip-flops in combinations of the above fields. Figure 5.14 shows
the reduced AVFs when the Modified Razor flip-flops are introduced in the Op-
code and Source Operand 2 fields (IQ wo opcode opr2), the Opcode and Source
Operand 1 fields (IQ wo opcode opr1) and the Opcode and Destination Operand
fields (IQ wo opcode dest). Figure 5.17 shows the percentage reduction in AVF
when the Modified Razor flip-flops are introduced in the combination of fields of the
IQ. We see that the when we introduce the Modified Razor flip-flops in Opcode and
Destination Operand fields, the average AVF reduces to 9.06%, which is a 46.87%
reduction from the initial value.
Similar analysis is done for the ROB as shown in Figures 5.18 and 5.19.
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Figure 5.16: Percentage decrease in AVF of Instruction Queue with Mod-
ified Razor flip-flops.
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Figure 5.17: Percentage decrease in AVF of Instruction Queue with Mod-
ified Razor flip-flops.
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Figure 5.18: AVF of Reorder Buffer with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Modified Razor flip-flops are introduced in the following fields - the Destination
Operand register specifier field (ROB wo destopr), the Destination Operand Value
field (ROB wo destopr value) and the Program Counter field (ROB wo PC). We
see that when our Modified Razor flip-flops are introduced in the Program Counter
field of the ROB, the average AVF reduces by 61.88% and the reduced value of the
average AVF is 11.58%.
Figures 5.20 and 5.21 show the reduced average AVFs and percentage re-
duction in average AVFs when the Modified Razor flip-flops are introduced in the
following fields of the Data Cache - Tag array (DL1 wo tag) and the Data array
(DL1 wo data). We see that the maximum reduction in the AVF of the data cache
is when our Modified Razor flip-flops are introduced in data array. The average
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Figure 5.19: Percentage decrease in AVF of Reorder Buffer with Modified
Razor flip-flops.
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Figure 5.20: AVF of Level 1 Data Cache with Modified Razor flip-flops.
AVF of the data cache reduces by 72.14% to a new value of 9.14%.
Figures 5.22 and 5.23 show the reduced average AVFs for the Load Queue and
the Store Queue. Figures 5.24 and 5.25 show the percentage reduction in the average
AVF of the respective structures after Modified Razor flip-flops are introduced. We
see that for both the structures, we obtain a maximum reduction (56.73% reduction
for LQ and 55.77% reduction for SQ) in the average AVF when our Modified Razor
flip-flops are introduced in the address fields of the structures. The reduced average
AVFs are 8.98% and 13.43% for the LQ and the SQ respectively.
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Figure 5.21: Percentage decrease in AVF of Level 1 Data Cache with
Modified Razor flip-flops.
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Figure 5.22: AVF of Load Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Figure 5.23: AVF of Store Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
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Figure 5.24: Percentage decrease in AVF of Load Queue with Modified
Razor flip-flops.
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Figure 5.25: Percentage decrease in AVF of Store Queue with Modified
Razor flip-flops.
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5.5 Increase in Area and Power
Introduction of of Modified Razor flip-flops also cause a decrease in the AVF of
the microarchitectural structure and also the overall processor. However, introduc-
tion Modified Razor flip-flops cause an increase in the area requirement and power
consumption for the microarchitectural structures because of reasons explained in
Chapter 4. We have modeled the microarchitectural elements in RTL to measure
the exact increase in area and power by introducing Modified Razor flip-flops in
some fields of the microarchitectural elements viz. IQ, ROB, LQ and SQ. The area
and power estimates for the Data Cache are obtained using Cacti [14]. Figures 5.26,
5.27, 5.28, and 5.29 show the area and power estimates for each of the microar-
chitectural structure under consideration. We have measured the area requirement
and power consumption by introducing Modified Razor flip-flops in different fields
which results in reduction in AVF. In addition to the fields identified in previous sec-
tion, we have estimated the increase in area and power consumption by introducing
Modified Razor flip-flops in all the fields of the microarchitectural structures under
consideration. This would result in an 100% reduction of AVF but we observed that
area and power increase by more than 100%.
From Figures 5.26(a), 5.27(a), and 5.29(a), we see that the area requirement
for both combinational and sequential elements increase. The area requirement for
sequential elements is due to the redundant flip-flop present inside our Modified
Razor flip-flop which facilitates error detection. The increase in the combinational
elements is due to the introduction of cells that implement the XOR comparotors
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Figure 5.26: (a)Area and (b)Power consumption of Instruction Queue
with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:IQ, 2:IQ wo operand1, 3:IQ wo operand2, 4:IQ wo dest,
5:IQ wo opcode, 6:IQ wo opcode dest, 7:IQ full
and also the ORing of the individual Error L signals from each of the Modified
Razor flip-flops.
5.6 Cost effective Percentage decrease in AVF
The main aim of the thesis is to find the most optimal choice for introducing
Modified Razor flip-flops in microarchitectural elements. We saw that AVF reduces
with the introduction of Modified Razor flip-flops but the area and power require-
ments increase which in-turn results in an increase in cost. Consider the following
scenario - From Figures 5.20 and 5.21, we saw that when Modified Razor flip-flops
are introduced in the data array of the Data Cahce, we get an average reduction
of 72.14%. From our estimates in Figure 5.28, we see that the area requirement
and power consumption for this case goes up significantly to levels which are not
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Figure 5.27: (a)Area and (b)Power consumption of Reorder Buffer with
Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:ROB, 2:ROB wo destopr, 3:ROB wo destopr oprval,
4:ROB wo PC, 5:ROB full
Figure 5.28: (a)Area and (b)Power consumption of Level 1 Data Cache
with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:DL, 2:DL wo tag, 3:DL wo data, 4:DL full
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Figure 5.29: (a)Area and (b)Power consumption of Load/Store Queue
with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:LQSQ, 2:LQSQ wo valid, 3:LQSQ wo addr,
4:LQSQ wo data, 5:LQSQ full
practical (183.4% increase in area and 189% increase in power). To obtain the most
cost effective choices of fields for the Modified Razor flip-flops, we have measured
the Percentage decrease in AVF per Area-Power product. Figures 5.30, 5.31, 5.32,
5.33, 5.34 show the percentage decrease in per mm2−mW for the microarchitectural
elements considered in this thesis. 5.7 shows the most optimal choice of fields in
the microarchitectural structures where the introduction Modified Razor flip-flops
results in a most cost effective reduction in AVF.
5.7 Observations
Introduction of Modified Razor flip-flops causes a reduction in the AVF of the
microarchitectural structures and hence the AVF of the processor. However, this
also causes an increase in cost factor and more specifically the area requirement and
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Figure 5.30: Percentage decrease in AVF per Area-Power product of
Instruction Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:IQ wo opcode, 2:IQ wo dest, 3:IQ wo operand1,
4:IQ wo operand2, 5:IQ wo opcode dest, 6:IQ wo opcode opr1,
7:IQ wo opcode opr2, 8:IQ full
Figure 5.31: Percentage decrease in AVF per Area-Power product of
Reorder Buffer with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:ROB wo destopr, 2:ROB wo destopr oprval, 3:ROB wo PC,
4:ROB full
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Figure 5.32: Percentage decrease in AVF per Area-Power product of
Level 1 Data Cache with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:DL wo tag, 2:DL wo data, 3:DL full
Figure 5.33: Percentage decrease in AVF per Area-Power product of
Load Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:LQ wo valid, 2:LQ wo addr, 3:LQ wo data, 4:LQ full
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Figure 5.34: Percentage decrease in AVF per Area-Power product of
Store Queue with Modified Razor flip-flops.
Legend - 1:SQ wo valid, 2:SQ wo addr, 3:SQ wo data, 4:SQ full
the power consumption. We found from our experiments that, with the introduction
of our Modified Razor flip-flops in certain fields of the microarchitectural structures,
the most cost effective decrease in AVF can be achieved. The overall AVF before the
introduction of all the microarchitectural elements is 22.5%. With the introduction
of Modified flip-flops in fields shown in Table 5.7 the overall AVF reduces to 15.27%,
which gives a reduction of 32.23%. The overall increase in area is 16.99% and the
overall increase in power is 10.33%.
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Reorder Buffer Program Counter Field
Level 1 Data Cache Tag array
Load Queue Source Address field
Store Queue Destination Address field





Soft errors have become a key challenge in modern microprocessor design. Sin-
gle Event Upsets and transient faults are a major source of soft errors. Eventhough
the soft error rates of individual transistors are projected to remain as roughly the
same for the next several technology generations, the overall per-chip fault rates
will continue to increase exponentially in accordance to Moore’s law. As a result,
even logic elements, which were not a great concern in the reliability perspective
earlier, have become a major source of concern. In this thesis, we address the issue
of ensuring reliability in the operation of the microarchitectural elements in a cost
effective fashion.
Soft errors that cause errors can be broadly classified as those which cause
errors in program outcomes and those which do not. Errors that do not cause errors
in program outcome do not pose a threat to the reliability of the processor. The
reliability of the processor and its microarchitectural structures are measured in
terms of Architecture Vulnerability Factor (AVF). AVF is defined as the probability
that a fault in a processor structure will result in a visible error in the final output
of a program. In this thesis, we have focused our effort on performing a detailed
analysis of AVF of the microarchitectural elements viz. the Instruction Queue (IQ),
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the Reorder Buffer (ROB), the Level 1 Data Cache (DL1), the Load Queue (LQ),
and the Store Queue (SQ). We have identified the fields of these structures which
contribute most significantly towards the overall AVF.
The technique to decrease the AVF of a structure is to ensure program cor-
rectness even with single bit soft errors. In this thesis, we have made design changes
to incorporate error detection capabilities into Razor flip-flops and introduced them
into one or more fields of structures that have significant contribution towards AVF.
We have measured the resulting decrease in the AVF and also the increase in area
requirement and power consumption. In order to find the most cost effective solu-
tion, we have measured the percentage decrease in AVF per area-power product for
all the combinations of fields with Modified Razor flip-flops. We then find the most
optimal solution and measure the overall decrease in AVF and increase in area and
power.
6.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have proposed an approach to maintain program correctness
by using the Modified Razor flip-flops in selected fields of the microarchitectural
structures viz. the IQ, the ROB, the DL1, the LQ, and the SQ. Since this caused
an increase in area and power, we identify the most optimal choices of fields which
provide the highest percentage decrease in AVF per the area-power product. From
our work, the fields are identified as Opcode and Destination Operand fields of IQ,
Program Counter fields of ROB, Tag array of the DL1 and Address fields of the
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LQ and the SQ. We found that with Modified flip-flops in the mentioned fields, the
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